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ABSTRACT
Using a novel eye-tracking test, we recently showed that great apes anticipate that other individuals
will act according to false beliefs. This ﬁnding suggests that, like humans, great apes understand
others’ false beliefs, at least in an implicit way. One key question raised by our study is why apes
have passed our tests but not previous ones. In this article, we consider this question by detailing
the development of our task. We considered 3 major differences in our task compared with the
previous ones. First, we monitored apes’ eye movements, and speciﬁcally their anticipatory looks, to
measure their predictions about how agents will behave. Second, we adapted our design from an
anticipatory-looking false belief test originally developed for human infants. Third, we developed
novel test scenarios that were speciﬁcally designed to capture the attention of our ape participants.
We then discuss how each difference may help explain differences in performance on our task and
previous ones, and ﬁnally propose some directions for future studies.
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Theory of mind is the ability to infer unobservable
mental states in other individuals, like desires and
beliefs;1 it is a key component of human social intelli-
gence. False-belief understanding, the ability to attri-
bute mental states that conﬂict with reality, is of
particular interest because it requires an understanding
that others’ behavior is not driven by reality, but by
their beliefs about reality, even when those beliefs hap-
pen to be false. Over the past few decades, researchers
have been attempting to determine whether nonhu-
man animals also possess a theory of mind. Great
apes, monkeys, and corvids have passed several impor-
tant tests used as markers of theory of mind in human
children, suggesting that they may be able to reason
about other individuals’ perception, knowledge, goals
and intentions (for a review, see ref. 2 for great apes,
ref. 3 for monkeys, and ref. 4 for corvids). However,
extensive debate continues over what mechanisms
underlie performance in such tests, and whether or
not animals’ success relies speciﬁcally on the capacity
to infer others’ mental states.5,6 One aspect that has
prevented clarity is the lack of evidence, despite
repeated investigation,7-11 that nonhuman animals
might understand others’ false beliefs.2,3
Using a novel eye-tracking test originally developed to
test human infants, we recently showed that great apes
anticipate that other individuals will act according to false
beliefs.13 This ﬁnding suggests that, like humans, great
apes understand false belief at least in an implicit way.
One of the key remaining questions is why apes passed
our tests but not previous ones. Although there are a vari-
ety of outstanding theoretical considerations, one thing is
clear: our study represented a substantial methodological
departure from existing paradigms used with apes. In this
article, we primarily focus on these methodological
aspects, although we also brieﬂy touch on certain theoreti-
cal considerations. More speciﬁcally, we describe how we
developed our test focusing on 3 key milestones: 1) devel-
oping and testing a technique to record apes’ anticipatory
looks, 2) choosing a task that Southgate, Senju, and Csi-
bra8 had pioneered to test children, and 3) adapting it by
crafting scenarios that would capture apes’ sustained
attention and deliver the key manipulations required to
assess their false-belief understanding. Next, we discuss
the possible reasons why this task provided evidence of
(implicit) false belief understanding while no other tasks
had done so to date. We close the article by suggesting
some directions for future research.
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Three key milestones
We begin by summarizing our study. Apes viewed short
movies on a monitor while their gaze was automatically
and non-invasively recorded using an eye-tracker. In
total, 41 participants, including bonobos, chimpanzees,
and orangutans, participated in our study. Our design,
controls, and general procedure replicated a seminal
anticipatory-looking false belief study with human
infants.12 There were 2 conditions, false-belief 1 and 2.
The movie consisted of 3 phases; familiarization, belief-
induction, and test. In both conditions, during a pair of
familiarization trials, a human actor saw an object be
hidden in one of 2 containers and then searched for it
there. In the second familiarization trial, the object was
hidden, and pursued, in the other container. In the false-
belief 1 condition, during the belief-induction phase, the
actor saw the initial hiding of the object, then saw the
object be moved to the other container. The actor then
saw the other container being touched (as a low-level
control; see below). Finally, the actor left the scene, and
while absent, the object was removed from the container
(and the scene). During the test phase, the actor (now
having a false belief about the object location) returned
to search for the object by approaching the middle of the
2 empty containers. The false-belief 2 condition was the
same as false-belief 1 except that, during the belief-
induction phase, the actor only witnessed the initial hid-
ing of the object and was away during its relocation to
the second container and subsequent removal. The
differences between these 2 conditions, in addition to the
actor’s additional action, ensured that apes could not
predict the actor’s search based on simple rules, such as
looking to the ﬁrst or last location where the object was,
or the last location the actor attended.
We tested apes using 2 different scenarios (Fig. 1c–d).
In experiment 1, a human actor chased an ape-costumed
character, and the ape-costumed character, serving the
role of target object, hid in one of 2 haystacks. In experi-
ment 2, a human actor and an ape-costumed character
competed for a stone, and the ape-costumed character
hid the stone in one of 2 boxes. When the actor was
approaching (or reaching to) the middle of the 2 con-
tainers, we recorded each ape’s ﬁrst look to either the
correct or incorrect container (relative to where the actor
believed the object to be) and measured looking time to
each container. Across 2 conditions and 2 experiments,
we conﬁrmed that apes looked in anticipation of the
actor searching in the location where he had last seen the
object, and therefore falsely believed it to be.
Our study relied on eye-tracking technology to mea-
sure apes’ eye movements. This technology has been
Figure 1. (A) Eye-tracking of an orangutan (B) and a chimpanzee. (C) One scenario used in the false-belief test (experiment 1; FB2 condi-
tion). The human actor chased the ape-character with a large stick. The ape character hid in one of the 2 haystacks and then, while the
human actor was away, moved from there. (D) The other scenario used in the test (experiment 2; FB2 condition). The human actor and
the ape-character competed for an object. The ape character hid the object in one of 2 boxes and then, while the human actor was
away, moved it from there while the human actor was away. The red arrows indicate the container where the human actor falsely
believed the object to be.
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used in neurophysiological research with monkeys for
several decades.14 However, only recently it became
available for noninvasively testing human infants and
great apes.16 Traditionally, eye-tracking required a par-
ticipant to be ﬁrmly ﬁxed during recording, which was
physically and ethically not possible for those popula-
tions. Recent advances in infrared eye-tracking technol-
ogy allowed participants to move their heads relatively
freely as long as they continued to face the eye-tracker
and monitor. To keep apes roughly in an appropriate
position, we let them sip a steady drip of juice through a
custom-made juice dispenser during recording (irrespec-
tive of their performance).
Eye-tracking allows researchers to examine where and
when participants attend to stimuli. It can identify the
focus of an individual’s attention with great precision.
Most importantly, it can inform the researcher whether
the participant is anticipating the actor’s actions by look-
ing at an object or location just before the actor physi-
cally acts on it. Thus, anticipatory looking occurs before
the anticipated event actually happens. It captures a pre-
diction based on the memory for past events and the
understanding about ongoing actions, rather than a
response to particular outcomes.
In preparation for our false-belief study, we ﬁrst
ensured that great apes make anticipatory looks to an
actor’s actions. First, Kano and Tomonaga17 and
Myowa-Yamakoshi, Scola, Hirata18 found that, when
watching an actor reach for an object, apes look at the
object typically a fraction of a second before the actor
grabs it, like humans,15,19 and monkeys.20 Second, Kano
and Call21 found that apes’ anticipatory looking is not
simply based on encoding of the movement patterns of
an actor’s reaching, but rather reﬂects an understanding
of the actor’s goals, as in humans.22 Speciﬁcally, in that
study, apes ﬁrst saw an actor repeatedly reach for and
grab the same object among 2 alternatives. Then they
saw that the locations of the 2 objects were switched.
When the actor reached to the middle of the 2 objects,
human infants and great apes anticipatorily looked at the
object that they had previously seen the actor grab. In a
control test, involving an unfamiliar claw instead of a
human hand, apes did not show goal-based prediction.
Third, Kano and Hirata23 conﬁrmed that apes can
anticipate previously-seen events based on long-term
memory. While their gaze was being monitored, apes
watched a movie in which an unfamiliar ape-costumed
character came out from one of 2 identical tunnels.
Twenty-four hours later, apes saw the same movie again.
They looked in anticipation at the tunnel where the ape-
character emerged last time, just before the character
actually appeared. In experiment 2, apes watched the
ape-character attack a human actor. The human actor
then reached for one of 2 different objects and used it to
attack the ape-character. Twenty-four hours later, apes
saw the same movie except one change; to examine their
memory for the object rather than for the location in this
experiment, the location of the 2 objects was switched.
As the actor was reaching toward the middle of the 2
objects, apes looked in anticipation at the object that the
actor had retrieved the day before, even though it was in
the opposite location—a result that replicated Kano &
Call’s17 ﬁndings.
These studies thus demonstrated that apes reliably
make anticipatory looks to an actor’s goal-directed
actions, and that their memory to elicit anticipatory
looks is robust and long-lasting. We then shifted our
attention to the question of false-belief understanding,
and speciﬁcally attempted to replicate one of the seminal
developmental studies that used a non-verbal looking
measure to investigate human infants’ false-belief under-
standing. There were 2 options available in nonverbal
looking approaches: violation-of-expectation tests like
the one developed by Onishi and Baillargeon, and antici-
patory-looking tests like the one developed by Southgate,
Senju, and Csibra.12 The violation-of-expectation tests
record for how long participants attend to certain events,
some expected and some unexpected, and assess whether
participants look at them differentially. Onishi and Bail-
largeon tested human infants in both true-belief and
false-belief conditions. In the true-belief condition, they
found that human infants looked for a shorter amount
of time when an actor searched for an object in its true
location, than when the actor searched for an object in
an empty location. In the critical false-belief condition,
human infants looked for a shorter amount of time
when an actor searched for an object in an empty loca-
tion where she falsely believed the object to be, than
when the actor searched for it in its true location. This
pattern is interpreted as an indication that infants
expected the actor to act according to her true- and
false-belief. Onishi and Baillargeon’s24 paradigm was
later used to test monkeys.10 Although monkeys showed
the same looking patterns as human infants in the true-
belief condition, they did not distinguish between the 2
outcomes in the false-belief condition, suggesting that
they attribute true- but not false-beliefs.
We decided to use an anticipatory-looking method
for 2 reasons. The ﬁrst is a pragmatic reason regard-
ing the number of individuals required in each para-
digm. In general, anticipatory looking tasks require
fewer participants than violation-of-expectation tasks.
Although we still required a relatively large number
of participants, we managed to recruit a total of 30–
40 apes between 2 different research facilities in Japan
and Germany.
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The second reason is that the anticipatory looking test
combines the low task demands of violation-of-expecta-
tion paradigms with the high interpretability of active
looking paradigms. In fact, Southgate, Senju, and Csi-
bra’s12 tasks can be conceived as a combination of Onishi
and Baillageon’s violation-of-expectation task and Clem-
ents and Perner’s anticipatory-looking test. Clements
and Perner confronted 2- to 4-year-old children with a
version of the classical (verbal) location change test but
also measured their anticipatory looks to the 2 potential
locations. As expected, children of all ages had a difﬁ-
culty providing correct verbal answers to false belief
questions, but 3- to 4-year-old children (unlike younger
ones) reliably made correct anticipatory looks consistent
with false belief understanding.
Southgate, Senju, and Csibra incorporated this antici-
patory-looking measure into Onishi and Baillageon’s test
such that all components of the test, including false-
belief induction and solicitation of looks, are non-verbal.
By doing so, they seemingly reduced the task demands
derived from verbal story-telling and verbal questioning.
Moreover, it is possible that the removal of the target
object from the scene before measuring anticipatory
looks contributed to further reducing task demands by
eliminating a potential reality bias. In fact, they showed
that even 2-year old children could pass their anticipa-
tory-looking false-belief test. Most importantly, by
adopting an anticipatory-looking paradigm, Southgate,
Senju, and Csibra ruled out some of the low-level alter-
natives that have been proposed as an explanation for
the Onishi and Baillageon’s24 results. Speciﬁcally, in the
anticipatory looking test, the participants cannot solve
the test based on the expectation that the actor’s igno-
rance will lead to error or uncertainty because they
should speciﬁcally anticipate that the actor will search
for the object where he falsely believes it to be.
We then attempted to replicate Southgate, Senju, and
Csibra’s anticipatory-looking test. However, we immedi-
ately faced a serious problem. Apes showed little interest
in the video stimuli that had been used with human
infants. Hirata and Yamamoto (unpublished) presented
the same videos that Southgate, Senju, and Csibra
had used but they did not sustain apes’ attention till the
end of the presentation. Kano and Call (unpublished)
tested apes by speeding up and shortening the presenta-
tion time, but the majority of apes still did not watch till
the end of presentation (for the movie, see https://youtu.
be/XcK1dVvefGQ). Consequently, in the current study
we made rather drastic changes to the movie scenarios
such that every scene and action was intended to maxi-
mize apes’ interest. For this purpose, Kano and Hirata’s
memory test, whose test movies were speciﬁcally
designed to create engaging and memorable events for
apes, was particularly relevant. Kano and Hirata’s movies
presented an unfamiliar hostile character (an ape-
costumed human) attacking familiar humans in a
familiar residential area. This scenario elicited moderate
excitement and high levels of engagement among the
apes during the entire presentation time. One bonobo
female even stopped drinking juice while watching as the
social conﬂict unfolded. Similarly, Kano and Tomo-
naga26 had also shown that, when watching movies of
conspeciﬁcs engaging in various social behaviors, apes
were most attentive to those depicting social conﬂicts.
Based on this evidence, we incorporated emotional social
conﬂicts into our false-belief scenarios. Yet, there were
still some concerns. By introducing emotional events,
some of the actions could have become so engaging that
apes may have overlooked the critical actions necessary
for the test (e.g. hiding of objects, exiting of the actor).
We thus used certain cinematographic tricks such as not
showing 2 actions simultaneously or introducing appro-
priate pauses between the actions. The outcome was clear
and unambiguous: apes watched throughout the video
presentation and attended to all the critical actions
depicted in it.
In sum, our study implemented 3 major changes rela-
tive to the previous false belief tasks with apes. First, our
measure of apes’ predictions was based on their anticipa-
tory looking behavior, recorded via noninvasive eye-
tracking. Second, we adapted a design by Southgate,
Senju, and Csibra,12 that was developed for human
infants. Third, we carefully crafted scenarios in which
every component was speciﬁcally designed to enhance
engagement of our ape participants.
Contrasting results from different paradigms
Let’s now return to one of the critical question raised ear-
lier. Why did apes pass our tests but not previous ones?
Yet, before considering the theoretical possibilities, we
emphasize the same point again that subtle differences in
the movie stimuli may make a difference in apes’ perfor-
mance. We believe that the movies should be at least
engaging enough, and also easy enough to understand,
for ape participants. It should be noted that, in the 2
experiments of our test, we obtained consistent results
but not identical effects. The effect was slightly weaker in
experiment 1 than in experiment 2, although we
obtained unequivocal results when we averaged the
results from the 2 experiments. It is thus important to
further pin down what movie features can effectively
enhance apes’ engagement and understanding of con-
tents by accumulating studies in future.
More theoretically, there are 3 possibilities. First, eye-
movement measures may reﬂect a different level of
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understanding about others’ beliefs than more traditional
active choice measures. Some have suggested that they
indicate an implicit understanding, in contrast to the
explicit understanding that is generally inferred from
correct responses on verbal and active choice para-
digms.25 In humans, it is only after 4 y of age that chil-
dren pass traditional false-belief tests in which they
verbally report their predictions about how a mistaken
agent will act (e.g., Where do you think Sally will look
for her marble?). However, even children younger than 2
y of age can pass modiﬁed false-belief tests involving
looking measures. Similar to the results with young
human infants, great apes have yet to pass false belief
tests in which they must make active choices based on
their false belief understanding, even though they were
able to correctly predict the actions of a mistaken agent
in our eye-tracking paradigm.12,27 Developmental psy-
chologists continue to debate how to interpret the differ-
ences in performance between tasks. In humans,
differential performance raises the possibility that the
tasks tap into different levels of understanding that
emerge, or at least can be detected, at different points
within continuous developmental process,28 or that the
different tasks measure 2 distinct theory of mind mecha-
nisms.29 These same possibilities exist for apes.
Second, every task imposes certain cognitive demands.
The looking-measure paradigms including both the viola-
tion-of-expectation and anticipatory-looking tasks were
speciﬁcally designed to minimize such demands. Com-
pared to active choice paradigms, participants must
remember less and for a shorter period of time, and there
are fewer inhibitory control demands compared with tra-
ditional tasks because participants do not need to translate
their understanding into action. Moreover, in the anticipa-
tory-looking task, the object that the actor seeks is
removed from the scene (i.e. both containers are empty)
before the actor returns to search for it. These design fea-
tures reﬂect the evidence that such removal of the target
object from the scene enhances human children’s perfor-
mance in verbal false-belief tasks.30 Participants can dem-
onstrate their predictions of the actor’s search behavior
without potential interference from the existence of a real
object in one of the locations.
Third, motivation may differ across tasks. For
instance, one of the clearest demonstration of visual per-
spective taking in chimpanzees was found in a context
where chimpanzees needed to compete for foods with
dominant conspeciﬁcs.31 Most other false belief tests
since then have relied on similar competitive setting.
However, it’s possible that in this kind of setting, the
presence of food to be competed for may make apes
overly excited and less inhibited, making it harder for
them to demonstrate their mental-state understanding
through their actions. In contrast, the interactions
depicted in our videos—third party social conﬂicts that
do not involve food—may have permitted the right bal-
ance between high motivation and cognitive control.
Future directions
We see at least 3 important directions for future studies.
First, we need to test other non-human species on antici-
patory looking false belief tasks, to determine whether
the abilities that we have demonstrated extend beyond
the great apes. Previous studies have investigated belief
understanding in monkeys using violation-of-expecta-
tion tests.10,11 In these studies, monkeys demonstrated
understanding of true- but not false-beliefs. This failure
of violation-of-expectation task by monkeys may indi-
cate that monkeys, unlike apes, do not understand
others’ false beliefs even in an implicit way. Yet, we cur-
rently lack 2 lines of evidence to support this claim. First,
apes have not been tested on a violation-of-expectation
task. Second, monkeys (or other species) have not been
tested on an anticipatory looking false belief task. Previ-
ous studies have demonstrated that monkeys (and cor-
vids) pass several important theory-of-mind tasks.3,4 In
addition, like apes and humans, monkeys anticipatorily
look at the target object of an actor’s simple reaching
action.20 However, it is unclear to what extent these looks
may be modulated by others’ goals and beliefs.
Second, Heyes32 recently proposed that domain-
general mechanisms, or a submentalizing process, can
explain our results (in line with her previous argument
that such processes are responsible for all positive false
belief ﬁndings in human infants). Focusing on our exper-
iment 2, she suggested speciﬁcally that apes may have
encoded, during familiarization, the appearance and dis-
appearance of the green shirt (the main actor), “the con-
ﬁguration of 3 cues (green center/bell rings/boxes ﬂash)
that signaled an excitingly novel event (the box taking
ﬂight), and a predictor of which box would ﬂy next – the
last location of the brick when the scene was green.” In a
critical test phase, “reappearance of the green shirt could
have acted as a retrieval cue, activating a memory of the
brick’s location when the green color was last present.”
Heyes then suggested that a particularly effective strategy
to test the submentalizing hypothesis is to use inanimate
controls, removing morphological and movement fea-
tures that are characteristic of biologic agents (e.g., eyes,
autonomous, contingent, goal-directed motions). We are
currently working on such a test.
Third, we should tease apart 2 different explanatory
frameworks for our results. It is possible that apes solved
our task by attributing a false belief to the actor.
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However, it is also possible that they exploited external
cues from the actor and applied a rule, e.g., that actors
search for things where they last saw them.33 In our test,
we attempted to minimize the likelihood of the rule-
based account by (i) never showing participants the
actor’s search behavior when he held a false belief, (ii)
using novel scenarios about which they could not have
learned any rules previously, and (iii) introducing a con-
trol (FB1 condition of Experiment 2) such that partici-
pants could not succeed by simply expecting the actor to
search in the location where he had last attended. None-
theless, we recognize that our false belief tests are in prin-
ciple open to some rule-based explanation that
participants just expect actors to search for things where
they last saw them.
To further examine the alternatives, there are cur-
rently 2 candidate tests. The ﬁrst is the content-change
test. In the test, the actor has a false belief about the con-
tents of a single container, rather than about the location
of single object (e.g., refs. 34, 35 with human infants).
This test is thus not open to the same alternative expla-
nation because the object stays in the same location. The
second is called the blindfold test.5,36 Senju et al.37 con-
ducted the blindfold test with human infants using a
modiﬁed anticipatory-looking test. In the test, 2 separate
groups of human infants ﬁrst experienced that the blind-
fold was either opaque or actually see-through. After
that, infants saw the movie. In the belief-induction phase,
they saw that an actor wore the same blindfold as the one
they experienced while the object was relocated. Only
human infants who experienced a true opaque blindfold
anticipated the actor’s action based on her false beliefs,
while the other group did not make any anticipation.
This test is thus not open to the alternative explanation
because participants should use their own self-
experiences, rather than relying on external cues, to rea-
son the last thing that the actor saw. Great apes have not
been yet tested with the same anticipatory-looking blind-
fold test. However, a recent study using behavioral meas-
ures showed that they could apply their own self-
experiences about occlusive properties of different
barriers in a visual perspective taking task.38
Finally, our method can be useful to test other cog-
nitive abilities in nonhuman animals such as memory,
causal understanding and meta-cognition. In this arti-
cle, we showed that great apes, like human children,
can understand certain contents shown in a movie.
That is, they can remember features of the movie
across days and anticipate impending events based on
this memory. They can also anticipate an agent’s
actions based on his goals and beliefs. Using movies,
one can recreate events and contexts that have tradi-
tionally been difﬁcult to simulate in experiments.
Eye-tracking also affords novel tools for measuring
subtle responses to these events. One of the key mes-
sages of this article is that there is enormous potential
for investigating the cognitive abilities of nonhuman
animals by capitalizing on these novel methodologies
as well as interdisciplinary collaboration.
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